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Teaching and Learning with Wittgenstein and Turing: 
Sailing the Seas of Social Media 
 
 
 
JULIET FLOYD 
 
Results of the Boston University Mellon Sawyer seminar 2016–2019 
(www.mellophilemerge.com) reveal that social and philosophical drives 
are increasingly central to our uses of technology, including AI. This 
raises critical challenges for democracy, especially in a hyper-
connected world where social media shapes human conduct in ways we 
are only beginning to appreciate.   
 A history of the mutual impact of Turing and Wittgenstein on one 
another points to the contemporary foundational significance of our 
artful capacity to embed everyday words in forms of life. Wittgenstein’s 
mature focus on forms of life, interlocutory drift, and rule-following, 
with its play between the ‘I’ and the ‘we’, was an informed critical 
response to Turing’s idea of a ‘Turing machine’, his analysis of the 
very idea of taking a ‘step’ in a formal system. Wittgenstein’s 
characterisations of our drive to evade a responsibility in speech, 
especially by appealing to ‘machines’ or ‘algorithms’ as pure 
mathematical objects, are invaluable warnings for us. The enduring 
importance of mutually-attuned ‘phraseology’ to education may be 
formulated as a humanistic challenge to the very ideas of 
‘computational foundations’ and ‘Big Data’ in our hyper-connected 
world. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
There is no steady unretracing progress in this life; we do not advance 
through fixed gradations, and at the last one pause:—through infancy’s 
unconscious spell, boyhood’s thoughtless faith, adolescence’ doubt (the 
common doom), then scepticism, then disbelief, resting at last in 
manhood’s pondering repose of If. But once gone through, we trace the 
round again; and are infants, boys, and men, and Ifs eternally. 
– Melville, Moby Dick, Chapter 114, The Gilder 
 
 
Only whom are we informing of this? And on what occasion? 
– Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations §296 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Social media buffets our words, carrying them rapidly into environments and contexts 
that are radically transforming not only our sense of meaning and world, but also our 
embodied lives and environments. We each need to navigate the seas, sailing about in 
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our own very different, overlapping ways. This is a situation foreseen both by 
Wittgenstein and by Alan M. Turing, whose philosophies are of increasing importance 
now, as I shall argue in this essay.  
 I want initially to share a bit of critical history about the computationally-driven 
world we live in, stressing that philosophical ideas lay at the basis of Turing’s 
invention of the stored program computer. At their heart, as has not been appreciated, 
Turing’s philosophical ideas about humans and machines are not behavioristic and 
mechanistic, but instead broadly Wittgensteinian, rooting our ‘phraseologies’ in social 
contexts of seeking and finding one another through words and images, shaped in a 
communal context in which harmonies of engagement, rather than consensus, are at 
stake. As Turing attested, his own ideas derived partly from conversations he had with 
Wittgenstein (cf. Turing, 1942–1944; Floyd, 2013). In turn, Wittgenstein responded to 
what he realised was Turing’s fundamentally transformative recasting of the 
foundations of logic in terms of human steps that are ‘mechanical’ in an intuitive 
sense: shareable commands everywhere embedded in evolving human forms of life 
and ‘phraseology’.  
 These facts—which I have argued for at length in a series of essays referred to 
in what follows—should lead us to considerably revise the usual story: that methods 
of formalisation contradict the taking seriously of our ordinary words in everyday life, 
and that investigation of what we say and mean, at the local level of everyday speech, 
is somehow contradicting the project of systematic formalisation, especially in the 
foundations of logic and mathematics. Many believe that in his early philosophy 
Wittgenstein embraced formalisation, and in his later philosophy he rejected it. But 
No! Better would be to say that he rejected the dichotomies implied in the usual story. 
It was not until 1937, however, that he managed to embed the necessarily dynamic 
interplay of these perspectives at the heart of his later philosophy. This, I have argued, 
was due to his reading of Turing. 
 On the usual story Wittgenstein and Turing were enemies: Wittgenstein the 
humanist, fighting mathematical logic; Turing the scientistic mechanist making 
apologies for it. Their exchanges over the nation of contradiction in Wittgenstein’s 
1939 Cambridge lectures on the foundations of mathematics (LFM) have led many, 
including Ray Monk, in his masterful biography, to regard Wittgenstein as making 
‘propaganda’ against Turing’s whole way of thinking (Monk, 1990, ch. 20).  
 My perspective is quite different. I believe Wittgenstein and Turing were, in 
fact, teaching and learning with one another. Rather than a seminar brawl, we have 
two thinkers engaged in mutual exploration and philosophical development, each in 
his own way. In his 2017 British Wittgenstein Society lecture, responding to my 
work, Monk remained unconvinced; I will not recapitulate my extensive arguments 
here, but instead summarise and extend the responses I gave at the 2018 London 
British Wittgenstein Society meeting.1 In fact, my reconstructions explain, not only 
what Turing really did, logico-philosophically speaking,2 but also why understanding 
the intersection of his ideas with Wittgenstein’s is crucial, not only for our 
understanding of Turing and Wittgenstein, but also for understanding our 
contemporary world. 
 Proceeding toward this latter goal, I shall first give a reading of the famous 
remarks §§193–194 in Philosophical Investigations, concerning the ‘machine’ that 
‘symbolizes its own actions [Werkungsweise]’—or ‘operations’, as the more recent 
translation has it. I think we might consider drawing the translation closer to that of 
Emil Post’s (human) idea of a ‘worker’, simply translating this as a machine that 
‘symbolizes its own ways of working’.3 As I have established elsewhere, these 
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remarks were first drafted by Wittgenstein after he held a discussion group at 
Cambridge with Turing and their mutual friend Alister Watson in the summer of 
1937: they are definitely a response to Turing’s analysis of an ‘effective’ step in a 
formal system in his (1936/7) paper ‘On Computable Numbers, with an Application to 
the Entscheidungsproblem’ (Floyd, 2016, p. 25, n. 33; Floyd, 2017). I shall argue here 
that Wittgenstein’s remarks are not intended to contradict or critique a functionalist 
philosophy of mind, as readings from Putnam and Kripke onward have assumed;4 
instead, Wittgenstein is noting that Turing used—just as had Wittgenstein before 
him—the idea of portions of human activity with words as the actions of unthinking 
‘machines’ (cf. the ‘reading machine’ passages in PI, §§157ff and BBB, §67)—and 
he is warning against misuses of Turing’s powerful reworking of this idea.  
 This reading allows me, next, to draw Wittgenstein and Turing into the orbit of 
current challenges affecting emerging uses of social media. Here I build on 
discussions 2016–2019 afforded through the auspices of the interdisciplinary Boston 
University Mellon Sawyer Seminar 2016–2019 in which I am currently participating 
as lead investigator.5 Our aim has been to give philosophy in particular, and the 
humanities in general, central foundational places at the table in our discussions of 
emerging media and new forms of life.  
 The BU Mellon Sawyer Seminar has affirmed a strong conviction of mine: that 
the humanities in general, and philosophy in particular, will become, over time, more 
and more crucial for our world. This is beginning to be widely sensed, as ‘AI and 
Ethics’ and ‘digital humanities’ become catchphrases and eddies of study where 
engineers, librarians, lawyers and humanities professors interact. My idea is different, 
less a matter of engineering than of working as philosophers always have, with words 
and discussions that reflect our capacity to shift our perspectives on what is important 
in life and in our world, allowing us to attend to what we care about, aspire to, and 
feel. We must continually re-embed our words and images in a variety of forms of 
life, just as Wittgenstein said, in order for our technology to be useful and enhance 
rather than demean us.  
 The doing of philosophy, by each and every one of us, is in fact becoming 
increasingly recognisable and fundamental in everyday life, as the automation of tasks 
and the disruptions and inventions of new forms of life goes on. Pressures of handling 
indirect discourse multiply, becoming pervasive. The ubiquity of our epideictic uses 
of words is increasingly part of the environment. And our demands, individual and 
social, for visibility and recognition, but also privacy, creativity and individuality, 
become seemingly more urgent. Virtual selves are commercial necessities for younger 
users, but also sources of anxiety and distraction. We are engaged in a grand 
experiment involving the human community as a whole: soon another billion users 
will come online with voice activated technology. But what really is the issue of 
voice? Here is a key question, both for democratic forms of life, and for each and 
every one of us. 
 What is fundamental in current uses of social media is the Rousseauian drive 
that Stanley Cavell so aptly made central to his philosophy: we each demand 
acknowledgement, desiring to be recognised as worthy of respect by others who, in 
turn, are worthy of respect, desiring and seeking significance, at the same time, for 
ourselves.6 This was confirmed empirically by some of the earliest studies of mobile 
technology made by my collaborator James E. Katz, with his colleagues.7 It is no 
accident that these sociologists, who focus on structural affordances, phenomenology, 
biology, and elements of our creativity and desire in the face of new technologies, led 
the way. For their surveys asked users what they did and felt, and opened our eyes to 
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the unexpected, novel uses of mobile phones as they first entered our public and 
private spaces. What these studies show is that ethics is ubiquitous in human uses of 
this technology, though varied, just as it is in ordinary conversation: the press toward 
individuality and community are both there, both dynamic. These issues are present in 
ways that can be partly, but surely not fully, resolved by the creators of technology 
with their expertise in the design of code.  
 Our situation is dynamic: it is one of searching. We seek and we sometimes 
find, but we are constantly shifting our sense of the questions, as well as the 
satisfactoriness of the answers, a sense of what is worth searching for, and how and 
when and why. Philosophically we should aim to appreciate the differing kinds of 
searching that characterise our lives with social media, and not pretend that ‘Big Data’ 
are a mechanical way of resolving questions without human qualitative judgements. 
On the contrary: as data get more and more extensive, they grow more and more 
difficult to manage. It is the qualitative standards, the need for intelligible overviews, 
situated, human perspectives—what Wittgenstein called übersichtliche Darstellungen 
(surveyable representations)—that will become more and more, not less, important.8 
 It falls to philosophy, particularly in its role in education, to characterise the 
broad sense in which reason-giving, commitment to words and truth, and a sense of 
self-realisation through expression matter and may be developed, understood, and 
represented in our world. Here everything from reflection on the dynamism and force 
of what Cavell called ‘passionate utterance’ to popular culture, imagery and literature, 
are increasingly relevant (Cavell, 2005). In the end the point will be to focus, not on 
human-machine interaction, but on human-human significance in the presence of 
machines. 
 
SEAS OF WORDS: PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS§194 
 
It is no accident, I believe, that Wittgenstein developed his notion of a Lebensform, a 
form of life with words, after ingesting Turing’s landmark paper (Turing, 1936/7) 
introducing the idea of what Alonzo Church called a ‘Turing machine’ (Floyd, 2016). 
Wittgenstein needed something philosophically deeper than the idea of a ‘culture’. In 
The Blue and Brown Books, to imagine a language is to imagine a ‘culture’ (Kultur); 
in 1937, the term Kultur drops out of the manuscript of the Philosophical 
Investigations altogether, replaced by ‘forms of life’. To imagine a language is, 
hereafter, to imagine a form of life with words: not a Lebenswelt as something given, 
but as something continually recreated, woven and cobbled together with criss-
crossing perspectives and lives with words (Floyd, 2018b).9  
 It is also no accident, in my view, that Wittgenstein’s image of seas of words 
(Wellen) occurs precisely at the point in Philosophical Investigations where he is 
responding to Turing’s (1936/7) analysis of taking a ‘step’ in a formal system of logic 
(PI §194, which is glossed below). Apparently paradoxically—but only apparently 
so—by putting to work the idea of a human being used as a ‘machine’, Turing undid 
the sublimated ideal of formal logic as a super-machine.10 In the Investigations 
Wittgenstein is crediting him with this, but warning his readers against taking the 
undoing wrongly. 
 The heart of Turing’s contribution was to cut through the jungle of formalisms 
and equations by imposing a vivid, simplified model upon formal, mathematised logic 
as an analysis of its fundamental character. The model is a language-game, in 
Wittgenstein’s sense: that of a human computor acting or reckoning step-by-step in 
accordance with a locally framed rule without thought, in a ‘mechanical’ manner. By 
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means of this move, Turing made the idea of logic ordinary, rather than sublime (cf. 
PI §89).  
 Historians have been long puzzled about how Turing put his analysis together 
so quickly in 1935–1936. But the likeliest proximal inspiration for Turing’s move are 
the rules construed as tables in The Brown Book (BBB §§41ff; cf. Floyd, 2017). There 
is a specific point where Wittgenstein reaches for the idea of what he calls ‘general 
training’ with tables—i.e., what it is to train a human being to use any such table. 
This idea, of any such table, crystallises Turing’s sophisticated, revolutionary move. 
The important point about this, for our purposes, is expressed in Wittgenstein’s later 
remark: ‘Turing’s ‘Machines’. These are humans who calculate’ (RPP I §1096).  
 This is something, Wittgenstein points out in the Investigations, that we tend to 
forget: 
 
§194. When does one have the thought that a machine already contains 
its possible movements in some mysterious way?—Well, when one is 
doing philosophy. And what lures us into thinking that? The kind of 
way in which we talk about the machine. We say, for example, that the 
machine has (possesses) such-and-such possibilities of movement; we 
speak of an ideally rigid machine which can move only thus-and-so.  
 
We are ‘lured’, says Wittgenstein, into thinking about logic—at least the step-by-step-
reckoning-according-to-a-rule part of it—as a super-machine, lured into superstitious 
ideas about logic by our own words, our own ways of talking about its ‘possibilities of 
movement’. We shift the locus of modality from us onto our model, the machine, and 
away from what we human beings do and feel and need—as if what belongs to logic, 
and more generally following rules, goes on anyway, quite apart from what we do in 
writing things down, making demands of one another, parametrising procedures, 
seeing and establishing measures of similarities and differences, and so on. 
 Wittgenstein’s point is not to criticise idealisation as such. Nor is he simply 
rejecting a Platonic picture or realism in general. Much less does he have in mind 
rejecting logic or the idea of reckoning-according-to-a-rule, or the use of machines to 
offload laborious human repetitive tasks.11 At this particular place in the 
Investigations he is scrutinising a human tendency of projection, reflected in certain 
ways of conceiving logic’s role. That tendency to lean on the algorithm as such, as if 
it is ultimately neutral, is all around us now, and we need philosophy to develop a 
self-conscious response to it. 
 It is a signal theme of Wittgenstein’s work as a whole to stress the importance 
for logic and philosophy of seeing a situation (a step, a life, an inference, a world, a 
use of a word or even a click of a mouse) as a realisation of one possibility among 
many various ones, rather than taking philosophy to be describing what it is that 
happens actually to be. The point is to break the hold of false necessities, false senses 
of order, false ideas about how logic and necessity evince themselves in our lives. PI 
§194, continues by pursuing this line:   
 
The possibility of movement—what is it? It is not the movement, but it 
does not seem to be a mere physical condition for moving either—such 
as there being play between socket and pin, the pin’s not fitting too tight 
in the socket. For while this is empirically a condition for movement, 
one could also imagine things to be otherwise. The possibility of a 
movement is supposed, rather, to be like a shadow of the movement 
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itself. But do you know of any such shadow? And by a shadow I do not 
mean some picture of the movement—for such a picture would not 
have to be a picture of just this movement. But the possibility of this 
movement must be the possibility of just this movement. (See how high 
the seas of language run here!).  
 
Here are seas of words, ending in a tautology about this possibility being just this one. 
As elsewhere in the Investigations, we are shown the emergence of our deep need for 
exemplary necessity, a willingness to take a step we regard as something taken 
together, to accept words as used in an exemplary or paradigmatic manner, a 
particular possibility as showing itself to us. 
 The ‘shadow’ is the idea of an extension: a full-blown set of items, unordered 
but simply grouped-as-such, to which a concept or rule or algorithm ‘applies’ of itself. 
Every item ‘in’ or ‘out’, period—no movement at all, no standards of correctness, no 
room, in particular, for our uses of words to characterise it. ‘The waves subside as 
soon as we ask ourselves: how do we use the phrase ‘possibility of movement’ when 
we are talking about a given machine?’ (ibid.) We must return, in other words, to our 
own lives with words, taking up a partial point of view, one in which we have fixed 
on an example, and can explore. Wittgenstein, like Turing, is not refuting or 
contradicting the extensional point of view, but instead insisting that it cannot be 
regarded as fundamental for all intents and purposes. 
 The extensional conception is familiar in logic and mathematics, and an 
appropriate way of thinking for certain contexts, particularly those in which we wish 
to reason about infinite collections which cannot be represented by a particular rule. 
Irrational numbers provide a halfway house: they may be characterised by rules, but 
exhibit irregularly patterned features of procedures, differing from the procedures we 
use with rational and whole numbers. 
 To fix on an example, let us use the following decimal expansion to ‘picture’ π: 
 
 3.141592653589793 … 
 
We may regard this—as mathematicians often do—as a procedural (idealised) 
expansion according to a rule. But we may also regard it differently, as picturing a 
finished extension ‘as if already fully written down’.12  
 As if: a fiction, or myth, of a procedure. On my view Wittgenstein does not 
think the extensional point of view is wrong: it is of course very natural, indeed 
needed (‘necessary’ in that sense). But we have a tendency to transform its way of 
seeing things into a ‘mythology’ (PI §221), one which occludes the importance of our 
ordinary rags-and-dust procedures with numbers, concepts, words, forms of life—our 
movements with signs, our writings down and takings in. In fact, it is the ultimate 
point of the extensional perspective to make what we do—our limited procedures and 
modes of conceptualisation and characterisation—even our highly circumscribed, 
mechanical ones—irrelevant.  
 We should take up the extensional perspective for certain purposes—if, for 
example, we are to reason about actually infinite objects in mathematics, or say in 
general what a real number is. But using it, we erase the idea of a procedure, picturing 
it completed and done. But then nothing is done: what we have is no action, no 
movement at all. There is no room for movement, action or imagination here, these are 
all eclipsed by the perspective. And yet the tendency to fall back upon the language of 
‘imagining’ (which brings back the idea of movement) may be seen creeping its way 
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nearly inevitably into our talk about concepts in logic. Erasing movement is difficult, 
conceptually (see, for example, Williamson, 2013). Yet it is a necessity for the 
extensional point of view, taken pure—and so wrongly. In fact, set theory is shot 
through and through with procedures and ways of thinking that depart from this 
purity. 
 The fact that we can take up the extensional perspective and develop it is one 
thing, the status of the perspective itself another. For this perspective does not and 
cannot erase or make irrelevant the interest of our particular, local procedures—how 
for example it is that we become acquainted with, show someone, write down, help 
someone to see the face of, a particular real number such as π—or fail to. (Never mind 
a particular set!) These activities, embedded in proofs and in pictorial, heuristic 
devices are, in fact, leaned on, and needed for the interest of the extensional 
perspective itself (Floyd and Mühlhölzer, forthcoming). 
 We tend to get things backward, in a quasi-Hegelian reversal. If we regard our 
particular activities as ‘shadowed’ by the extension, then we still must see them as 
shadowed, elongated, shorn of their inner workings, eclipsed like the moon can be. 
But then what we do is, still, like the moon, the embodied source of the shadow. To be 
shadowed is to be. A shadow is no model or picture of what it is the shadow of, for it 
does not allow us to recognise the face, the specific features, the full range of 
possibilities, of what it shadows.  
 If we wish to talk about the ‘possibilities of movement’ in logic or reckoning-
according-to-a-rule, there is no getting past the exemplification of particular 
possibilities in our ways of reckoning. That means thinking about the human, end-user 
perspective: processes, procedures and steps of reckoning that are offered and 
accepted, worked with, disputed, and so on: spoken checks made with spoken words. 
(Wittgenstein once wrote, ‘The role of the sentence “I must have miscalculated” is 
really the key to understanding the “foundations” of mathematics’ (RFM III §90, 
slightly altered translation). 
 In PI §194, Wittgenstein is crediting Turing with developing the idea of a 
human ‘machine symbolising its own action/ways of operating/ways of working 
effectively’ (PI §193) into an analysis of logic that breaks the hold over us of ‘the 
logical super-machine’. The point is not that we are (or are not) machines. Instead, we 
picture and analogise, and behave within our lives in different ways. As Wittgenstein 
stresses, it is all too human to suppose that all the sources of meaning and objectivity 
lie outside of us and inside the super machine, i.e. the machine that has no movement 
at all, the algorithm-(or formalism-)-in-itself. Wittgenstein ends PI §194, this way: 
‘Though we do pay attention to the way we talk about these matters, we don’t 
understand it, but misinterpret it. When we do philosophy, we are like savages, 
primitive people, who hear the way in which civilized people talk, put a false 
interpretation on it, and then draw the oddest conclusions from this’. 
 The image of sailing upon waters—of adventures to meet ‘alien’ ways of 
thinking that we think of as ‘primitive’, but turn out to be really our own—is as old as 
the Odyssey and as recent as Walden. Self-knowledge requires a journey. Driven to 
the image of seas of language by thinking through the power of the idea of a Turing 
machine, Wittgenstein is warning us. Our responses to Turing’s ‘machines’ are likely 
to be ‘primitive’ and ‘uncivilised’. And so it surely is today, as such machines 
continue to pervasively penetrate everyday life. We imagine that a ‘super-machine’ 
will take care of handling ‘fake news’; will care for our parents; will enable us to 
construct ‘the Moral Machine’ through checklists and surveys of Trolley Problems.13 
We get things exactly backwards, failing to see human beings as the beginning and 
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the end of it all, the true ‘primitive’ in the logician’s foundational sense. We read the 
‘Turing Test’ as a contest between human and machine, rather than seeing it as a 
human-to-human search for words in the presence of machinery. We forget the social 
world, the importance of shareable commands and inviting questions. We place 
significance in the wrong place, in the wrong way. We forget our own plasticities. We 
forget how it is that human time-scales and concepts may be prejudicial and illusory; 
we forget that our words and histories require collaboration, diversity of 
interpretation, and communication over massive scales of time and infrastructure. 
 The sea is inviting, nourishing, gloriously unfathomable, irresistibly beautiful, 
constantly changing, drawing on our sense of sublimity. Yet it is also filled with 
danger, drawing out our most human drives to dominate, enslave, pollute, isolate and 
exhaust ourselves in efforts of mastery.  
 Being a New Englander, I must recall Moby Dick: 
 
With a philosophical flourish Cato throws himself upon his sword; I 
quietly take to the ship. There is nothing surprising in this. If they but 
knew it, almost all men in their degree, some time or other, cherish 
very nearly the same feelings towards the ocean with me.  
 There now is your insular city of the Manhattoes, belted round by 
wharves as Indian isles by coral reefs—commerce surrounds it with 
her surf. Right and left, the streets take you waterward. Its extreme 
downtown is the battery, where that noble mole is washed by waves, 
and cooled by breezes, which a few hours previous were out of sight 
of land. Look at the crowds of water-gazers there.  
 Circumnambulate the city of a dreamy Sabbath afternoon. Go from 
Corlears Hook to Coenties Slip, and from thence, by Whitehall, 
northward. What do you see? —Posted like silent sentinels all around 
the town, stand thousands upon thousands of mortal men fixed in 
ocean reveries. Some leaning against the spiles; some seated upon the 
pier-heads; some looking over the bulwarks of ships from China; 
some high aloft in the rigging, as if striving to get a still better 
seaward peep. But these are all landsmen; of week days pent up in lath 
and plaster—tied to counters, nailed to benches, clinched to desks. 
How then is this? Are the green fields gone? What do they here?  
 But look! here come more crowds, pacing straight for the water, and 
seemingly bound for a dive. Strange! Nothing will content them but 
the extremest limit of the land; loitering under the shady lee of yonder 
warehouses will not suffice. No. They must get just as nigh the water 
as they possibly can without falling ... Why did the old Persians hold 
the sea holy? Why did the Greeks give it a separate deity, and own 
brother of Jove? Surely all this is not without meaning. And still 
deeper the meaning of that story of Narcissus, who because he could 
not grasp the tormenting, mild image he saw in the fountain, plunged 
into it and was drowned. But that same image, we ourselves see in all 
rivers and oceans. It is the image of the ungraspable phantom of life; 
and this is the key to it all (Melville, 2015[1851], Chapter 1, 
‘Loomings’).  
 
Walden too situates itself with respect to a body of water. It is a place now badly 
distressed by human overuse, underused as a source of reflection.14 
Commented [FJ14]: I know Melville is wordy but I’d prefer to 
keep the long quote. 
Commented [rc15]: This is an unusually long block quote. 
Should we shorten the length? 
Commented [rc16]: Author does Walden need to be in italics in 
the footnote? 
Commented [FJ17]: Yes italicize “Walden” as you have done 
Teaching and Learning with Wittgenstein and Turing 
© 2019 Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain. 
9 
 The web is larger than us, but fragile like a pond or sea. In the end, it is our 
words in the presence of one another, in lived conversation, whether it is face-to-face 
or virtual, on which the good or evil of the whole will depend. Our conversations, our 
mutual education of one another in everyday life, are like the tiny crustaceans on 
whose lives the entire functioning of the ecosystem rests. Without attending to them, 
the whole will collapse or drown us.  In fact, this is an old idea, fundamental to the 
very sense of education as Bildung: structured life-paths, the search to find our way 
through forming ourselves. In our world, symbolism will increasingly matter; the 
issues of voice, stance and care will be central. Meaningful conversation will become 
more and more important to us, and perhaps rarer, in any case more condensed, 
pressured. Sherry Turkle has begun to document the decline in measures of empathy 
among children who are the first to have been raised from birth in the presence of 
mobile technology (Turkle, 2015). Others have documented increased levels of 
loneliness and divorce among social media users in the United States (Valanzuela et 
al., 2014).  
 It is time for reflection, for all of us: datasets that categorise our behavior cannot 
replace the end-user’s stance and sense of self. 
 
SEARCHING 
 
Searching is precisely the point where the philosophical conceptions of Turing and 
Wittgenstein intersected. ‘Intelligence’, both for Wittgenstein and for Turing, is what 
Turing explicitly called an ‘emotional’ concept—i.e. it is response-dependent 
(Proudfoot, 2013). It consists, ultimately, in appreciating the Fragestellungen of 
questions, the different kinds of question-‘placings’ with which one may engage (cf. 
the Preface to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus). The theme of transposing the terms of a 
question in order to resolve it is, of course, a constant in Wittgenstein’s writing 
throughout his life: he often analogises difficult conceptual (mathematical, 
philosophical) questions to riddles, where the terms of the question must be 
interrogated and transposed in order for a solution to be found.15 This idea makes 
itself felt through the literary strategies of Philosophical Investigations, where 
questions are rounded upon and recast over and over again.  
 It is also salient in Turing’s logico-philosophical work. Some of our searches 
are routine, even algorithmic. Others are—and sometimes probably—not. Turing’s 
earliest intellectual coup was resolving the ‘Decision Problem’, Hilbert’s 
Enscheidungsproblem, in the negative. This is the problem of whether or not there is 
an algorithm—a routine a machine might compute—to determine, for any sentence, 
whether or not it follows from a collection of other sentences.16 If there were such a 
‘decision procedure’, then truth itself, insofar as it can be traced in deductive 
argument (e.g. much of mathematics) would be mechanisable, and so vanish as we 
know it.17  
 G.H. Hardy made fun of the idea of a general decision procedure, writing that 
because of the psychological and verbal ‘gas’ surrounding the teaching and learning 
of mathematics, ‘it is only the very unsophisticated outsider who imagines that 
mathematicians make discoveries by turning the handle of some miraculous machine’ 
(Hardy, 1929, p. 18). But in The Brown Book Wittgenstein took the idea of using 
humans as ‘machines’ seriously. And with Wittgenstein’s help, Turing came to 
transpose what had been a mathematician’s problem (worked at in the Hilbert school 
thorough the development of formal systems and ‘effective’ systems of equations) 
into a philosophical one. For Turing showed the intrinsic necessity of a variety of 
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search strategies precisely by domesticating Hilbert’s idea of ‘the logical “machine”’. 
He began with a ‘language-game’ in Wittgenstein’s sense: a snapshot of a human 
being used as a ‘calculating machine’, given paper and pencil and trained to reckon a 
series of digits and discrete tasks without thinking. This activity takes place in a social 
world. It is not encoded in any kind of functionalist-cum-mechanist psychological 
series of brain states. As Turing explicitly wrote, 
 
We avoid introducing the notion of a ‘state of mind’ by considering a 
more physical and definite counterpart: it is always possible for the 
computor to break off from his work, to go away and forget all about 
it, and later to come back and go on with it. If he does this he must 
leave a note of instructions (written in standard form) explaining how 
the work is to be continued [by a co-worker]. This note is the 
counterpart of the ‘state of mind’ (1936/7, p. 263).  
 
The heart of the argument—just as in The Brown Book, is on reflection—shareable, 
humanly intelligible command structures.  
 By means of this snapshot model Turing was able to analyse, philosophically, 
what a ‘step’ in a formal system of logic, or in an algorithm in general is. He made the 
notion of a formal system plain, ‘home-spun’ (hausgebacken), to use Wittgenstein’s 
phrase—by embedding it in human life (cf. Wittgenstein, 1998–2000, 2015, MS 152, 
p. 196; Floyd, forthcoming-b). 
 To show negatively that there is no general decision procedure, one must 
analyse what in general a formalism or algorithm or effective procedure is. It will not 
do to write down another formal system. Instead, one has to do something conceptual, 
something philosophical: interrogate and reconceptualise the terms of the riddle.  
 Turing assumed, in accordance with his language-game, that ordinarily human 
calculators will go on indefinitely, proceeding in a ‘circle free’ way, calculating digit 
after digit. However, if we imagine one overarching ‘machine’ that can decide, for 
every ‘machine’, whether or not it is circle-free, then we can construct by means of it 
another ‘machine’ that is circular, and so ill-defined. This purported ‘machine’ would 
calculate along without mishap, until it runs into the command telling it what to do for 
itself. And this command, necessarily, is empty, tautologous, meaninglessly private. It 
is analogous, as I have argued elsewhere, to drawing a card in a board-game that says, 
‘Do What You Do’ (Floyd, 2012, 2017). It is a ‘command’ that cannot be followed. 
Like Narcissus, it falls into the pool, undoing itself as a ‘machine’, and showing us 
that the limits of formal logic lie, not in worries about contradicting ourselves, but in 
our own entanglements with self-picturing, self-commanding, self-spontaneity, and 
creativity. 
 For ‘Do What You Do’ is a perfectly good command if we are located in a 
context in which we understand what we are doing, in which we have the friction of a 
form of life, one or another purposive activity we are engaged in. But in the context of 
the Decision Problem we are robbed of this. And then we are sure to run into a 
command that we cannot follow: we can’t do anything with it. As Wittgenstein later 
remarked about Turing’s argument, a command (i.e. a search) ‘only makes sense in 
certain positions’ or placed contexts (Stellen) (RPP I §1096; cf. Floyd, 2012).  
 The general ‘Do What You Do’ machine fails to be an indefinitely calculating 
‘machine: it has broken the picture we began with. This implies, as Turing made clear, 
that the most fundamental notion in logic is that of a partial routine, one that is not 
everywhere defined. We are, necessarily, forced to sail the seas of inquiry cobbling 
Teaching and Learning with Wittgenstein and Turing 
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together our quests bit by bit, weaving words into our lives through choices and 
discussion and argument with one another. There are simples—beginnings of routines 
and commands and symbolic rule-following—but these ‘simples’ are fluid, ubiquitous 
and relative, everywhere contestable. We are, as Neurath famously said, ‘like sailors 
who must rebuild their ship out on the open sea, without ever being able to take it to 
pieces in dry dock and rebuild it anew from its best parts’ (Quine, 2013[1960], 
Epigraph). In Philosophical Investigations ‘forms of life’ are the backdrop to 
language-games, the place where harmonies among us and the ‘weave of life’ are 
cobbled together, collected and formed. Wittgenstein’s literal term is Lebensteppich, a 
‘rug of life’ on which we sit, chat, bind, stan, and walk (PI PPF i §2).  
 But what does all this have to do with the increasingly grandiose claims being 
made nowadays for AI? And what of the effects of social media, our sea of words? 
The answer is that the web is not a context: neither a form of life nor a life world. It is 
rather a sea of dynamic, evolving word- and image-streams that sometimes runs high. 
It is often conceived, and rightly, as a flood of information, rather than a cloud 
(Gleick, 2011). I have argued that it falls to the human users to embed the word- and 
image-uses in life as we go. 
 In closing, I want to revisit the earliest steps Turing took to sketch an answer. 
 In the founding document of AI, ‘Intelligent Machinery’ (1948), Turing battled 
against the idea that we already know enough of the concept of ‘intelligence’ to rule 
out extending our term at some point in the future to artificial devices. As in his later 
(1950) ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’, written for philosophers, he used a 
logician’s move.18 Because we do not have a general analysis of ‘intelligence’, we 
cannot prove an impossibility (as Turing had done with the Decision Problem). 
‘Intelligent Machinery’ is a report Turing wrote to the National Physical Laboratory 
just before leaving London for Manchester. Emphasising ‘the varieties of machinery’, 
he reported on the ideas of heuristic searching (which cuts down on calculating time 
by narrowing down searches based on hunches), random networked searching 
(anticipating connectionism), expert knowledge databases (based on interviews with 
human experts). He then turned toward speculation about the long-term future.  
 First, he argued against the idea of attempting to build a machine that would 
look and act like a human being: 
 
One way of setting about our task of building a ‘thinking machine’ 
would be to take a man as a whole and to try to replace all the parts of 
him by machinery. He would include television cameras, microphones, 
loudspeakers, wheels and ‘handling servo-mechanisms’ as well as some 
sort of ‘electronic brain’. This would of course be a tremendous 
undertaking. The object if produced by present techniques would be of 
immense size, even if the ‘brain’ part were stationary and controlled the 
body from a distance. In order that the machine should have a chance of 
finding things out for itself it should be allowed to roam the country-
side, and the danger to the ordinary citizen would be serious (2004, p. 
420/2013, p. 508).  
  
One is tempted to think here of driverless cars. Turing continues: 
 
Moreover even when the facilities mentioned above were provided, 
the creature would still have no contact with food, sex, sport and many 
other things of interest to the human being. Thus although this method 
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is probably the ‘sure’ way of producing a thinking machine it seems to 
be altogether too slow and impracticable (2004, p. 420/2013, p. 508).  
 
Turing implies here that we have better things to do than to encode into machines 
abilities in sex, sport, and so on. Here he had not failed to envision the compulsion in 
contemporary life toward ‘sex robots’: it is still an outstanding question, whether 
prosthetic friendships will or will not better satisfy certain human beings for certain 
purposes.  
 Next, under the heading of ‘discipline and initiative’, Turing picked up on the 
(Wittgensteinian) dialectic between constraint-by-rule and creative going-beyond-
rules that is part and parcel of our understanding of (human) ‘mechanical’ behavior. 
He took a philosophical side-tour, speculating that there would be three kinds of 
search that would become most significant in the future development of computation: 
 
1. The Intellectual Search (for algorithms onto which we may offload human routines 
such as finding numbers with certain properties); 
2. The Genetical or Evolutionary Search (the criterion of success here is survival—
Turing here anticipates the notion of a genetic algorithm, now common in 
computational biology using DNA); and finally 
3. The Cultural Search.  
Turing describes ‘The Cultural Search’ in human terms alone: there are no machines 
in it. What he says is this: 
 
… [T]he isolated man does not develop any intellectual power. It is 
necessary for him to be immersed in an environment of other men, 
whose techniques he absorbs during the first 20 years of his life. He 
may then perhaps do a little research of his own and make a very few 
discoveries which are passed on to other men. From this point of view 
the search for new techniques must be regarded as carried out by the 
human community as a whole, rather than by individuals (2004, p. 
431/2013, p. 516).  
 
Turing’s emphasis on human communication, self-understanding, and even 
democracy is explicit.19 He pictures our co-evolution with machinery as an evolving 
human conversation searching through a long scale of time, driven forward by a 
dynamic interaction between human cultural striving, definability of concepts in 
‘phraseology’, and technological and biological creation. The echoes of Peirce’s 
conception of values in a universe of chance seem more than accidental. By taking the 
notion of evolving, communally-secured intelligence to be manifested in an evolving 
variety of interlocking forms of search, Turing is insisting, as he did elsewhere, that 
the development of the creative and shared ‘phraseology’ of human language, a 
common sense of ‘common sense’, is crucial to ‘intelligence’. He also, quite 
remarkably, predicted the levelling of national boundaries in our interlocking 
networks of communication, now shaping public spaces and behaviour on a global 
human scale —Turing brought human movement back to the heart of logic. 
 On this view, self-consciousness per se is not the mark of intelligence. Nor is 
‘intelligence’ something to be generally defined, much less imitated generally by 
machines. Instead, it is what Turing calls an ‘emotional’, family resemblance concept: 
a human, response-dependent notion, like color or freedom. The mark of 
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‘intelligence’, Turing says, is appreciation of the variety and nature of different forms 
of human search: 
 
The extent to which we regard something as behaving in an intelligent 
manner is determined as much by our own state of mind and training 
as by the properties of the object under consideration. If we are able to 
explain and predict its behaviour or if there seems to be little 
underlying plan, we have little temptation to imagine intelligence. 
With the same object therefore it is possible that one man would 
consider it as intelligent and another would not; the second man would 
have found out the rules of its behavior (2004, p. 431/2013, p. 516).  
 
Turing’s instinct here is to turn to what Wittgenstein called ‘language-games’, 
sometimes referred to as ‘experiments’ by Wittgenstein himself, in The Brown Book. 
Sketching a game he would later make famous as the ‘Turing test’, Turing writes: 
 
It is possible to do a little experiment on these lines, even at the 
present stage of knowledge. It is not difficult to devise a paper 
machine which will play a not very bad game of chess. Now get three 
men as subjects for the experiment A, B, C. A and C are to be rather 
poor chess players, B is the operator who works the paper machine. 
(In order that he should be able to work it fairly fast it is advisable that 
he be both mathematician and chess player.) Two rooms are used with 
some arrangement for communicating moves, and a game is played 
between C and either A or the paper machine. C may find it quite 
difficult to tell which he is playing.  
 (This is a rather idealized form of an experiment I have actually 
done.) (2004, p. 431/2013, p. 516).  
 
The point of this test is the interactions among the humans, not solely their 
interactions with a machine.  
 At the moment, the largest internet industries are gaming and pornography. 
  
CONCLUSION 
 
Realigning Wittgenstein and Turing on questions about the foundations of logic is 
important for realigning our sense of reality today. Underneath our current sea are 
powerful computational processes and data farms, formalised languages and coding 
techniques that have evolved over time, proof-correction techniques, applications and 
interweaving of algorithms designed with exquisite delicacy. Each of these involves a 
tremendous amount of human labour, especially control of reckoning-to-rule 
behaviour. Also a tremendous amount of raw materials and ecological stress, as ‘rare 
earths’ are utilised to construct the mobile devices that are for so many of us our 
constant, increasingly powerfully symbolically condensed companions. (There are at 
the moment more cell phones than humans on the planet.) But the labour of the 
humanities, of education amongst us as conversation, must not be forgotten or lost. 
 We are only at the beginning. The idea of embedding mobile technology in 
everyday life and developing an ‘internet of things’ is gaining reality. Imbuing our 
present sea are powerful forces of capitalism: ever-faster task-managed exchanges, 
dark webs of pornographic desire and criminality and fun, cognitive psychological 
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profiling, confessional sharing, institutional needs and a bias toward quantitative 
measurement over qualitative judgement, not to mention commercially- and 
politically-driven manipulation of our desires, as cognitive avatars of our consuming 
selves are constructed through every recorded click we make. Social profilings are 
given to us increasingly by governmental authorities, who are beginning to utilise 
genetic mapping to control and divide us. What ‘free speech’ means, and what 
‘censorship’, have become cloudy issues. And yet there are also forces of activism, 
new ideas about activism’s role in connecting otherwise unconnected people.20 
 Our seas of language will get rougher before they calm. Insofar as we aspire to 
sail the waves while retaining some sense of true democratic community and tradition, 
we must not forget that permeating every feature of our uses of machines—insofar as 
we are not mere parrots, but make claims—is our social, evolving world of forms of 
lives with words. We are sailors on the seas of language. As has been urged by Paul 
Standish, via a masterful reading of Coriolanus, the body politic requires education 
that will allow learners to see and speak for themselves; to allow them to find 
significance in their lives of learning; to have a ‘voice’ in their searches and the 
satisfactions they find together (Standish, 2005; cf. Laugier, 2015, also on forms of 
life as ‘voice’).  
 The very concept of ‘information’, demarcated and so artfully titrated by 
Turing, we have seen, presupposes a world of activities in which symbolic structures 
mean, people care, requests and commands are intelligible, and spontaneity plays a 
role. It follows, just as Turing predicted, that in the end the quest for culture—i.e. the 
humanities and philosophy—is to become more and more important. ‘Information’ 
cannot be properly used as if it is a factive idea, for it is neutral as to truth and falsity, 
neutral as to its purposes without the enrichments of place, stance and context. But 
algorithms are not ultimately neutral at all. As is becoming increasingly evident in 
journalism, which more and more encroaches on each of us as social media users, the 
struggle and search for truth in all its aspects will continue to be, a very human thing 
(Floyd, 2019; Katz, 2011; Katz and Mays, 2019).  
 We need to take the humanities seriously in this computationally-situated world. 
They are not an add-on, they are a foundation. New ways of thinking and speaking, 
and conceptualising what ‘progress’ in education, self-understanding, the objects of 
our knowledge and desire and self-comprehension really are, are desperately needed. 
In the end, it will be our qualitative grapplings with the seas of our language, with the 
search for what it is to become someone in life through questioning and searching—
i.e. philosophy—that will determine, in great part, our forms of life.21  
 
 
Correspondence: Juliet Floyd, Boston University, Department of Philosophy, 745 
Commonwealth Avenue, Room 516, Boston, MA, USA.  
Email: jfloyd@bu.edu 
 
NOTES
                                                             
1. Monk’s lecture can be found online at: 
https://www.britishwittgensteinsociety.org/eighteenth-british-wittgenstein-society-
lecture.  My response in 2018 is available online at: https://vimeo.com/286157182. 
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2. Happily my interpretation explained, before their discovery, why it was that Turing 
continued study of logical notations (Leibniz, Peano, Weyl, etc.) while at Bletchley 
Park; cf. his notebook ‘Notes on Notations’ (1942–1944), sold at Bonham’s in New 
York for over US$ 1,000,000 in 2015: see: 
https://www.bonhams.com/auctions/22795/lot/1/. 
3. Independently of Turing, Post concocted a model of a ‘step’ in a formal system 
virtually equivalent to that of Turing; interestingly he used language describing, not a 
machine, but rather a human ‘problem solver or worker’ (Post, 1936). This led him to 
regard the classical limitative results in logic as indicating limits to the human mind—
something not true of Turing. 
4. Cf. Kripke 1982, passim. Putnam assumed from the early 1960s onward that the point 
of a Turing machine is to model trial and error search at the human psychological level. 
Only later did he debunk his own functionalism (Putnam, 1988). In our final 
conversation, when I mentioned my a-psychologistic interpretation of Turing’s notion 
of a Turing Machine, he still regarded it as a model ‘built for an alien’, though I argued 
against this point of view, as I am doing here.  
5. Cf. https://www.mellonphilemerge.com/. The grant is held with my Boston University 
co-PI’s James E. Katz (Director, Division of Emerging Media and Center for the Study 
of Mobile Communication) and Russell Powell (Associate Professor of Philosophy). 
The Mellon Sawyer funding supports the creation of novel interdisciplinary centres 
focused on faculty development and aimed at new paths of research. In our BU Sawyer 
Seminar we have also developed new curricula, sponsorship of post-docs and graduate 
students, and approaches to teaching. By 2018 all of our Sawyer Fellows were hired 
into competitive philosophy positions. See also Floyd and Katz, 2016 and Katz and 
Mays, 2019. 
6. The loci classici are Cavell, 2002[1969] and Cavell, 1999[1979]. 
7. See Katz, 2003, 2008, 2014; Fortunati et al., 2003; Katz and Aakhus, 2004. 
8. Compare the Interview with Gary King by Floyd and Katz (Floyd and Katz, 2016), 
Chapter 24; a videotape of part of the interview may be found at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tUZMYf2X0V8, accessed 13 August 2019. 
9. Cf. Floyd, 2018b: as I stress in this paper, the term Lebenswelt never occurs in 
Wittgenstein’s writings. 
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10. It is this to which I take Wittgenstein to be referring in his lectures on aesthetics §§23–
30, given in 1938 (LA, pp. 15ff; cf. ‘Lectures on Religious Belief”, LA, pp. 67ff); cf. 
RFM I §119ff. 
11. Wittgenstein was perfectly aware, from his study of Reuleaux while a student, that 
machine-pictures could be used modularly, to illustrate the step-by-step workings of a 
machine, and also create illusions of workings as well. See Reuleaux, 2012[1876] and 
Wilson, 1997 for a (critical) analysis of the impact on the rule-following remarks. 
Unlike Wilson, I do not take Wittgenstein’s interest in Goethe to bespeak a lack of 
hard-headedness about philosophy of mathematics. 
12. For an extensive discussion, see Floyd and Mühlhölzer, forthcoming. 
13. See: http://moralmachine.mit.edu/. Accessed on 14 August 2019. 
14. However, Marshall Medoff, a local Massachusetts ‘amateur’, was inspired by his visits 
to Walden to dedicate himself for a decade to a reclusive life of research on behalf of 
the idea of working with, rather than overcoming, the environment. Edison-like, he 
discovered the secret of how to extract sugars from plants to create clean biofuel that 
can run cars made today, as well as sweeteners that will not decay teeth 
(https://www.cbsnews.com/news/marshall-medoff-the-unlikely-eccentric-inventor-
turning-inedible-plant-life-into-fuel-60-minutes/). 
15. On riddles cf. Diamond, 1991 and Floyd, 2007.   
16. Ironically, perhaps, Wittgenstein had first framed this decision problem in terms of the 
notion of a ‘tautology’ in a letter to Russell, in 1913 (Dreben and Floyd, 1991). This is 
one reason to suspect that Turing’s work resolving it would have been of vivid interest 
to him.  
17. Derek Jacobi’s incomparable performance in the film Breaking the Code conveys 
Turing’s down-to-earth matter-of-factness about this question, as he says to the 
incredulous officer at Bletchley, ‘It’s a matter of true and false, really, right and 
wrong’. 
18. Incidentally, Wittgenstein never saw Turing’s paper, but, hearing about it, told Normal 
Malcolm that he guessed it would be no ‘leg-pull’. On whether it was or was not, see 
Floyd, 2012, p. 27, n. 9. 
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19. On the idea of a ‘democratic’ community in Turing as the need to avoid what he called 
the ‘straightjacket’ of an overarching formalism, see Floyd, 2017, p. 141. 
20. Cf. BU Mellon Sawyer Seminar at https://www.mellonphilemerge.com/past-
events/digitizing-human-rights-archiving-activism, accessed 23 February 2019; 
compare Groshek and Tandoc, 2017. 
21. I am grateful for the opportunity to speak at the 2018 British Wittgenstein Society 
meeting organised at the University College London Institute of Education. The 
audience’s perceptive responses have helped shaped my thoughts. Special thanks are 
due to Paul Standish for his editorial patience and insight, to my colleagues James E. 
Katz and Russell Powell, and for the BU Mellon Sawyer Seminar, the Andrew S. 
Mellon Foundation.  
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